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A NOTE ON NEW DIRECTIONS IN PLANNING 
Brian Van Arkadie *J 
A. Prologue: the climate of opinion 
1. Issues of planning technique and method can not be pursued very 
far in isolation from an examination of the political context in which 
planning is likely to take place and the substantive economic issues to 
be confronted. Nor can new directions be identified without some 
examination of the weaknesses of past efforts. 
2. A renewal of interest in economic planning may be seen almost as a 
cyclical phenomenon in itself. In recent years, in the industrialized 
economies, multilateral agencies and important parts of Latin America 
there has been a ascendancy of ideas about policy which have emphasized 
monetarism, liberal trade policies and redutions in government inter-
ventionism (for the sake of brevity designated here as the free market 
approach). At the international level, this view seeks adjustment to 
persistent balance of payments difficulties through a policy mix 
involving massive exchange rate adjustment, severe repression of 
domestic demand particularly through contraction of the public budget, 
and trade liberalization. The limitations of that approach in the 
Latin American context are now becoming widely recognised, as evidenced 
by the recent unorthodox initiatives by the governments of a number of 
important Latin American countries. 
3. It would not be surprising if developments in the industrialized 
economies also provide a political challenge to the ascendant conser-
vative economic thinking in the coming two to three years. The 
pendulum is beginning to swing. "New directions" may in part be seen 
as an attempt to respond to a new political moment by formulating a 
coherent approach to policy in the mixed economy as an alternative to 
the current ascendancy of free market thinking. 
4. The exploration of "new directions" for planning must not only 
address the increasingly evident inadequacies of free market policies 
in practise, but must also confront the record of earlier periods of 
government interventionism, which preceded the rise of free market 
orthodoxy in the 1970s. Did the conservative revival feed on the 
failures of thé earlier period? Does examination of that question 
throw light on the required dimensions of new directions in planning? 
*/ The views expressed in this work are the sole responsibility 
of the author and do not necessarily coincide with those of 
the Organization. 
2 
5. The political ascendancy of tree market thinking can be inter-
preted as a response to the extended crisis in the world economy, which 
became evident in the 1970s. However, it is not self-evident that 
crisis should engender such a doctrinal response. After all, the 
response to the crisis of the 1930s was increased government interven-
tionism - the New Deal in the US, a range of radical initiatives in 
Latin America, even aspects of fascist corporatism in Europe. The 
eventual emergence of the welfare state in Europe and the post-war 
hegemony of Keynesian economic thinking can all be seen as a response 
to the crisis. 
6. At a superficial level it might be argued that crisis destabilizes 
existing establishments, and the post-war economic establishment was 
that of New Deal - Keynesianism. In the industrialized economies, 
however, what was striking was not so much the political success of the 
new right, as exemplified by Reagan and Thatcher, as the abdication of 
the middle (New Deal Democrat, Keynesian, Social Democratic Welfare 
Statist). The shift in policy represented no just a defeat from 
without but was also a collapse from within. 
7. This is surprising, as before the onset of crisis the long period 
of active government interventionism had been remarkably successful 
hot-h in the industrialized economies and many parts of the periphery, 
in terms ul plausible performance criteria, as reflected by a genera-
tion of sustanied prosperity in the industrialized economies and 
historically high rates of growth in much of the periphery. This being 
so, it is really rather extraordinary that a leader writer's myth that 
Keynesianism failed should have been so easily established. Even the 
view that import substitution "failed" in Latin America was only 
established against rather abstract measures of efficiency or by 
comparison with the extraordinary successes of East Asia (apart from 
many questions which can be raised about the validity of rather 
superficial international comparisons much beloved of economists, it 
might be questioned whether even in the boom, export-led industrial 
growth would have been such a good bet if everyone had climbed on that 
particular bandwagon). 
8. It is a fact that the boom ended, but it has neither been estab-
lished that, assessed against reasonable criteria, the interventionist, 
welfare state policies of the boom period performed badly nor that they 
contributed to the boom's end. Indeed, for many by now Keynesian 
"failure" must seem greatly preferable to monetarist success. An 
adequate exploration of the surprisingly sudden death of the Keynesian 
consensus would require far more than a few discursive comments at the 
beginning of a short note. For our purposes, however, it might be 
useful to select a few observations. 
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9. During the long post-war boom, the managed market economies of the 
industrialized economies were able to resolve potential conflicts In a 
heavily positive sum game. Government spending and modest programmes 
of redistribution sustained high levels of demand. Welfare measures 
promoted consensus and government intervention stabilized labour 
markets. Public funds promoted technical progress, albeit most 
decisively through defense spending. International development policy 
initiatives with a strong redistrlbutive emphasis in the early 1970s, 
as exemplified by the ILO World Employment Programme, Basic Needs and 
all that, represented an effort to translate this Keynesian consensus 
at the Centre into a set of policies for the periphery at precisely the 
moment the consensus was crumbling under the pressure of inflation at 
home and an international environment of heightened competititon and a 
disintegrating financial system. 
10. At the centre national governments were faced with twin needs: 
(i) to gain greater control of incomes and restrain the growth in 
consumption in the face of the slow down in the world 
economy, 
(ii) to accelerate the pace of structural change to adapt to fast 
changing economic conditions in a slowly growing inter-
national economy. 
The system had two ways it could go. Either public consumption could 
be cut and the market could be used to discipline the work force and 
create the conditions thought appropriate for a faster pace of adjust-
ment through private initiatives or greater intervention was required 
to control price and wages, and to directly stimulate structural adap-
tation. 
11. Both were tried. The political contradiction faced ty those who 
supported the interventionist option was that whereas they saw the need 
to restrain income growth and promote structural change their political 
base was among those seeking to increase the wage share and to protect 
the existing job structure. The proponents of the interventionist 
state accepted that new policies were necessary but were successful 
neither in formulating the economic content nor establishing a poli-
tical basis for a new initiative. 
12. The free market option was also faced with contradictions - the 
monetarist policies brought down inflation and disciplined the work 
force but at a heavy cost to many parts of the private sector; more-
over, the combination recession and heightened international compe-
tition gave rise to intensified protectionist pressure. The commitment 
to the free market has had a perverse although predictable effect of 
undermining the conditions necessary for liberalization of inter-
national trade. 
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13. Erosion of the Keynesian consensus also resulted xroro a changing 
view of the state among some of those political progressives who would 
have been among the first to rally to the defense of the interven-
tionist state in earlier periods. For many of those most directly 
engaged in promoting the welfare and rights of the underprivilaged, the 
institutions of the state came increasingly to be seen as part of the 
establishment - part of the problem rather than the solution. In the 
development field, radicals joined the conservatives in their criticism 
of aid. In the industrialized countries, the ambiguities and compro-
mises which had provided the successful political base for the Mar Deal 
- welfare state rendered it suspect to the new left. 
14. A discuss!on of the evolution of policy doctrine at the centre is, 
of course, only indirectly related to Latin American events. However, 
the impact of the crisis has greatly reduced the freedom of manouvre of 
governments in the more badly affected peripheral economies and has 
rendered them more vulnerable to the economic doctrines emanating from 
the centre. As transmitted through the IMF and supported by economic 
doctrines now dominant in the industrialized economies, important 
aspects of external economic policy (the exchange rate; debt manage-
ment; the trade regimes) are raised from the status of instruments of 
policy to be treated as the ultimate ends, the success or failure of 
policy to be judged by the movemenr towards external balance, rather 
than from the consequences of policy for the welfare of the local 
population. 
15. Adventures in liberalization have not replicated the success of 
East Asia. (Indeed in key parts of East Asia itself, growth has 
faltered.) Despite low growth rates and deteriorating living condi-
tions external debts have continued to accumulate. Of course ideo-
logues of the free market can argue that their policies were not 
properly applied, as much as advocates of planning can point out that 
planning has never really been tested, but pragmatism must react to 
outcomes not to hypothetical virtues. 
16. It could be argued that the free marketeers have been quite 
successful in some aspect of their project - the boundaries of state 
economic activity have been pushed back, the role of the welfare state 
reduced. It can even be argued that in part the very high rates of 
unemployment, perceived as a failing, are an integral part of the 
project, reducing labour's bargaining power and creating the conditions 
for survival in a more competitive economic environment. But it is not 
evident that the conditions for sustained economic revival have been 
created; the capitalist animal remains dispirited. In the centre, the 
result is a resurgence of protectionism, an unsurprising contradiction 
of the liberal ideology of the period. Throughout much of the peri-
phery the economic devastation to be observed is difficult to view as a 
therapeutic purge likely to restore vigour to the system, when it seems 
likely to kill the patient. The need for "new directions" is palpable. 
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B. The style of economic planning 
17. The introductory paragraphs posed a choice between a "free market" 
and an "interventionist" position in the mixed economy. In the past 
what has been designated as economic planning might be seen as one form 
of government interventionism, in principle, at least, quite compre-
hensive and systematic in form. Whereas the case can be made that 
government interventionism had many successes, it would be more 
difficult to claim that comprehensive exercises in economic planning in 
mixed economies had much of a record of success. It was in 1968, after 
all, that Dudley Seers chose the Crisis in Planning as the topic for 
the inaugural conference of the IDS Sussex. We are all familiar with 
the litany of failure in relation to comprehensive planning exercises -
"targets" set for variables which could not be controlled nor even 
predicted, expectations of economic behaviour which had more to do with 
faith than analysis, a lack of clarity regarding key instruments and 
actors, and failure by governments themselves to accept the discipline 
of the plans formulated on their behalf. 
18. We are all familiar with the virtues of comprehensive planning in 
principle, involving a process whereby sectoral and project plans can 
be co-ordinated and integrated, probably through an iterative process, 
testing internal consistency and feasibility, and providing an explicit 
framework for public allocation of resources. However, comprehensive 
planning has probably always been something of a Utopian concept in a 
mixed economy, and particularly where decision making takes place in 
the context a certain political pluralism. While an appropriate 
response to crisis may be more vigorous intervention to push the 
economy in one direction or another, conditions of crisis make the 
technical aspects of comprehensive planning even more difficult to 
fulfil than in more stable times. The pursuit of comprehensive 
planning therefore probably involves delusions of grandeur, although 
comprehensive planning models may be of heuristic value. 
19. If comprehensive planning is not very practicable how far is it 
useful to talk of planning in the mixed economy at all? Certainly much 
of the practicle economic business of government, and the pedagogical 
needs of economists, can be subsumed under the various economic policy 
headings (e.g. fiscal and monetary policy, trade and exchange rate 
policies etc.)» or treated in the context of the application of welfare 
economics to project analysis. Moreover, it is certainly more useful 
to understand how an economy works than to gain command over theories 
and techniques of planning which have little to do with the way 
decisions are in fact made. In particular in the mixed economy, key 
policy instruments work through the market» A precondition for 
influencing the market is understanding it. Nevertheless there is a 
strong case for taking an overall and systematic view of the economic 
activities of the state to provide a context within which to interpret 
the part played by the various tools of policy. 
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20. In this sense economic planning in the mixed economy is nothiag 
more that an attempt to place government economic decision making in a 
more systematic and coherent framework than would normally be achieved 
through the piece meal treatment of economic policy. Economists tend 
to provide an intellectual framework for doing this by treating govern-
ments in much the same way as they treat individuals or firms: the 
government is assumed to have certain characteristics of rationality 
and to possess ordered utility functions. While this approach has 
been productive, it has been so in part because it avoids a treatment 
of actual decision making processes which are the stuff of politics, 
with which economists may very well be at home in their working roles 
but which professionally they find it convenient to define as outside 
their particular competence. While this may be a useful tactic, it is 
surely an unsound basis for proper understanding or for an adequate 
pedagogy. However although I have been long convinced that study of 
planning processes should extend into a treatment of the realities of 
political decision making processes, I have yet to see this done 
effectively in the training of economic planners. 
21. In a brief note it would be foolhardy to probe at any depth the 
contentions matter of the theory of the state in capitalist society. 
However, it might be useful to briefly, and somewhat cynically, 
characterize sume of the function« of state interaction in the mixed 
economy, in which competing economic interests are likely to contend 
for political influence, although typically the administrative system 
is likely to be particularly responsive to dominant economic interests. 
Broadly, state intervention in the economy can be seen as having three 
contrasting dimensions: 
(a) Management broadly consistent with the interests of dominant 
economic groups by, 
(i) supplying public goods (infrastructure) 
(ii) orchestrating the efforts of the private sector where 
this is unlikely to be achieved effectively through the 
market (e.g. promoting the collective business interest 
in the international economy) 
(iii) resolving conflicts and massaging recalcitrant elements 
to provide a congenial (profitable) environment for 
private economic activities 
(iv) disciplining groups who might unsettle the plans of the 
dominant interest 
(v) undertaking macro-economic management tasks which are 
inherently a central government responsibility 
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(vi) monitoring the rules of the game which govern competi-
tion between competing groups in the economy. 
(b) Entrepreneurship: at times the State can play an entrepre-
neurial role promoting structural change, derived from an 
intellectual technocratic image of the future, beyond that 
emanating from private economic actors. 
(c) Redistribution: the State may act to redistribute income and 
wealth, most dramatically when political events result in a 
sharp disjunction between the political and economic struc-
ture, but also as a rational pre-emptive strategy supported 
by the more far sighted among the privileged. 
22. The fulfilment of these functions does not require a comprehensive 
planning exercise; after all we are addressing the issue of planning in 
mixed economies, in which the bulk of economic activity continues to be 
co-ordinated through the market and much of the detail of economic 
decision making is of no great concern to government. Even a more 
interventionist policy should be selective in scope and in practice the 
analysis of the impact of policy will always be partial. To guide its 
own actions the government need to analyse those elements of the 
economy which impinge on its central tasks (e.g. macro-economic 
management) and policy objectives. 
23. Whether the systematic intervention of government in the economy 
is furthered by a national plan is essentially a pragmatic issue. A 
national plan, conceived as a statement of government's medium term 
policy intentions and spending programmes, and its expectations for 
private sector performance, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for effective policy-making and intervention in the economy. 
It can be useful. It can, for example, provide the occasion for a more 
thorough-going stocktaking and revision of policy than would by likely 
in the normal course of events. It can provide a better context for a 
review of public spending programmes than an annual budgeting exercise 
and can concentrate the public mind on important resource allocation 
choices. Plan documents, on the other hand, have often been statements 
of aspirations of no more credibility than partisan election mani-
festos. Their formulation can also divert great amounts of profes-
sional energy from tasks which may be of more practicle effect. 
24. A somewhat different case can be made for indicative planning 
through which government assesses the broad implications of its own 
decision and those of other major economic actors for the economic 
environment. The formulation of an indicative plan could provide a 
useful context for co-ordinating public and private plans and in some 
circumstance could have a stimulating effect on expectations. The 
usefulness of indicative planning will depend at its credibility and 
therefore on its realism and on the apparent effectiveness of any 
consultation process from which the plan is derived. 
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25. Having argued that planning should be selective and partial, and 
questioned the necessity for a national "plan" as such is one not left 
with little other than ad hoc policy making, support for which perhaps 
reveals my (quasi) Anglo-Saxon origins and seems in contradiction to 
the very notion of planning? A not unimportant verbal point to note 
here is that there are two quite different meanings of "planning" - on 
the one hand, the orderly, considered and systematic formulation of a 
course of action, on the other hand, decisive or effective intervention 
in the economy. Decisive intervention is often opportunistic, a 
response to opportunity or crisis, involving a concentration of 
attention on a limited sphere of activity. Perhaps in this regard a 
useful distinction can be made in describing government economic work 
as between routine and strategic planning. 
26. Routine planning involves the systematic application of economic 
logic to the detailed day to day decision of government. For example, 
the public investment budget should be submitted to cost-benefit 
appraisal, at least for sustantial projects. Effective financial 
control should be exercised over the recurrent budget which should be 
formulated on the basis of systematic projections of revenues and 
expenditures. In some areas, programme and performance budgeting may 
be applicable (subject to the realistic constraints of administrative 
capacity). Within the public scctcr, manpower planning might Involve 
an ongoing assessment of manpower requirements, utilization performance 
and incentive systems. 
27. Planning in this sense should be built into the government 
decision making structure at the appropriate levels, with the necessary 
data support systems and established criteria. About such planning 
activity there is little new to be said at a general level. There is a 
considerable literature on project analysis and budgeting; and training 
in the available techniques is well established. Possibly one weakness 
is that the treatment of the economic logic of decision making at the 
sectoral and project level has been overemphasized as compared to the 
importance of a robust knowledge of the substantive character of the 
sector or project content (in respect of which government officials are 
often poorly equipped). 
28. While the bulk of planning activity in government involves 
routine, piece meal decision making, there is also a need for the 
government to make strategic choices both in relation to macro-economic 
policy and in pushing for those changes in institutions and the policy 
regime which it sees as key to the fulfillment of its political 
mandate. In these terms strategic planning can be seen as something 
quite different from comprehensive planning, in that far from address-
ing the full range of economic activities and formulating targets for 
all sectors of the economy, a relatively narrow range of tasks are 
ide ntified as requiring the attention of top policy makers. In the 
reality of politics, it is precisely by concentrating attention on a 
limited agenda that a government is likely to have some impact on 
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economic events. Concentration of attention on what is important is 
the way that effective use can be made of the scarce political resour-
ces of government. 
29. What this implies in terms of institutional structures is that two 
types of planning capacity are required. In the line ministries, 
government agencies and the finance ministry there is a need for a 
working capacity to plan and monitor the implementation of detailed 
projects and programmes - a routine planning and management capacity. 
There is also a need at the centre of the political system for a staff 
capacity, with the capacity to identify the priority areas for analysis 
and to advise the top political authorities regarding strategic 
choices. This is, of course, not an original view of the way policy Is 
made, as it reflects the actual practice in many countries. The 
distinction does not tend to be treated explicity, however, in academic 
discussion of planning and policy making. 
C. Strategic issues 
30. The strategic policy issues on the agenda of government depends on 
both the nature of the political regime, and its priorities, and upon 
the economic context. While it can be argued that virtually all Latin 
American and Caribbean countries have had to grapple with severe 
balance of payments problems in recent years in one form or another, 
there is a wide variation in their size, economic structure and 
politics. The policy agenda is therefore bound to vary greatly from 
country to country. In a broad sense, however, it is possible to 
identify certain strategic issues which are likely to be of common 
concern. Among possible area, three which are of very general concern, 
and which are interrelated are: 
(a) Short —term macro-economic management under conditions of 
balance of payments difficulty 
(b) Medium-term promotion of an efficient pattern of production 
and trade 
(c) Distribution issues, 
(a) Macro-economic management 
31. A number of Latin American government seem to be exploring the 
ground between the extremes of past IMF orthodoxy on the one hand, and 
a radical policy of repudiation of the debt and physical controls on 
the other. A central part of any research and training effort should 
involve intellectual support for such efforts. 
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32. This implies the formulation of alternative models of the adjust-
ment process, seeking adjustment paths which avoid the repression in 
domestic economic activity required by orthodox policies, through 
policy mixes which are coherent both in the sense that they are likely 
to be effective in practice and provide a plausible basis for inter-
national negotiation. 
33. This will involve analysis on two fronts. On the one hand, a 
systematic interpretation of the interplay of between domestic va-
riables and the balance of payments is required, including the budget, 
credit formation and money supply, the price-income generation mecha-
nism, the exchange rate and direct controls on the balance of payments. 
On the other hand, analysis is required of the external environment, 
including options in negotiating the debt. 
34. Implicit in this argument is the belief that there are a range of 
options available, and that in particular there are preferable courses 
of actions to the repression of domestic activity as a means of 
restoring external balance. Moreover, in relation to external negotia-
tions there are foreign interests at stake other than those of inter-
national creditors. It is unfortunate that external negotiations are 
exclusively focussed on the IMF and the banks, giving too much weight 
to the interests of bankers and too little to those of traders and 
direct investors. In the context of the debt however it is by now 
evident that debtors do not need to shoulder a disproportionate burden 
to service it, as it is in the creditors interest to maintain an 
appearance of good order in relation to a debt which will, anyway, not 
be repaid, while on the debtors side nothing would be gained from 
outright repudiation other than psychic satisfaction. 
35. Pedagogically, treatment of macro-economic issues requires an 
understanding of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, and 
the monetarist position on Inflation and the role of the money supply, 
alternative approaches to the exchange rate issues. Keynesian and 
new-Keynesian (structuralist) alternatives to the monetarist view and, 
perhaps most important of all, a systematic exploration of recent Latin 
American experiences, including actual experience with IMF programmes, 
examples of monetarist policies in practice and recent attempts at 
innovation in handling the external debt and the domestic income-price 
generation process (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Peru). 
(b) Medium-term production and trade policies 
36. If the short-term need is to ensure that the response to balance 
of payments problem is not simply one of deflation, the medium terra 
objective need is to restore growth momentum through a pattern of 
growth which avoids a future external payments block. The second area 
of concentration is therefore industrial and trade policies. 
1 1 
37. In recent years this area has been dominated by neo-classical 
economic ideas (e.g. Little, Scottt and Scitovsky; Belassa; Krueger). 
The strength of the neo-classical argument rest both on the logical 
case for flexibility and efficiency as a basis for effective industrial 
performance and reaping the gains from trade, and on the examples of 
extremely successful growth performance on the part of those NICs that 
achieved high rates of export-led growth. (It should be noted that 
Kaldor, on somewhat different grounds, was long an advocate of export-
led growth.) 
38. Without exploring the many issues relevant to this policy area, a 
few simple points might be made: 
(i) in this discourse, autarky cannot be treated as a plausible 
option. The potencial gains from trade are real, and the 
trading option provides a rough check on the efficiency of 
domestic resource allocation; i.e. there is considerable 
merit in the neo-classical logic; 
(ii) nevertheless efficient industrial growth and exploitation of 
the potential benefits of trade are not necessarily best 
achieved through a non interventionist free trade policy -
East Asian success, for example, apparently involved a strong 
element of organised transformation of the productive base 
which determines comparative advantage, with a skillful 
combination of exploitation of domestic markets and penetra-
tion of export markets - the trick seems to be to combine 
import substitution and export promotion in ways such they 
are complementary rather than contradictory; 
(iii) care should be taken in generalizing from East Asian expe-
rience - experience from the boom is not necessarily a good 
guide in a slow world growing economy, a widespread popular-
ization of the strategy is likely to have "crowding out" 
effects reducing the potential benefits, and more specific 
local conditions in addition to a supportive policy regime 
may be required for success (viz. the poor performance of 
export platform initiatives in the Caribbean); 
(iv) this suggests the need for concrete analysis of the variety 
of Latin American and Caribbean experience of industrial and 
trade policy. 
39. Industrial planning initiatives are likely to be most effective 
when designed as co-operative ventures between government and the key 
actors even despite possible conflicts of interest (e.g. between 
government and multi-nationals; between different industrial groups). 
Government must combine an activist role in support and orchestrating 
the growth in capacity to produce for domestic and export markets, with 
the manipulation of policy instruments to promote efficient production. 
1 2 
That Is, government and the productive sectors together need to create 
the conditions for a fast rate of adaptation to new technical oppor-
tunities and trading condition in world market. 
40. Conservative thinking has tended to see a high rate of adaptation 
to changing conditions as an outcome of an adjustment process which 
sharpens the competitive environment essentially through the combina-
tion of domestic deflation and exposure to heightened international 
competitition by reductions in trade barriers to open up the economy. 
The weakness in this position is that deflation undermines the pros-
pects for investment, required to create technical innovation and new 
productive structures. The alternative is to base non-deflationary 
macro-economic adjustment on investment programmes and shifts in 
incentive systems that generate new patterns of production. This 
requires analysis of policy options and interventionist strategies to 
promote positive structural adjustment. There is a real danger that 
alternatives to the rigours of monetarist deflation could, in practice, 
centre largely on defensive measures which minimize adaptation. 
41. In analysing policies and plans for international trade, the 
persistence of slow growth in the industrial economies will lend 
renewed urgency to the promotion of regional co-operation, South—South 
trade and countcr trade. ContlnnpH analysis is required of the record 
of modest successes and numerous failures in such areas. 
(c) Distributional Issues 
42. In economic policy as in many other aspects of human life, fashion 
come and go, but the poor remain, and in conditions of economic 
stagnation their numbers grow absolutely, and in many countries, 
relatively. Yet as the human need has increased, in the 1980s redis-
tribution has fallen out of fashion, at least at the level of inter-
national official discourse. The emphasis on basic needs of the 1970s 
has given a way to adjustment policies in the 1980s as though concern 
about poverty were a luxury to be indulged in during good times, only 
to be dropped when the going gets difficult. There is, of course, some 
harsh realism in such a reaction, in that as the claims of diminishing 
scarce resources intensifies it is the weak who lose. 
43. However, it is neither morally acceptable nor even wise in terms 
of the narrow self interest of the better-off (who, after all, have a 
particular stake in a reasonable degree of social stability) that the 
burden of adjustment should be borne by the already disadvantaged. 
44. There is therefore now an even greater need for work on distribu-
tional issues and analysis of the impact of policies on the condition 
of the poor. There is a need both to improve the welfare of groups 
outside the productive system (children; the old; the disabled) and to 
mobilize idle and low income labour in income generating productive 
activities. The 1970s saw significant professional developments in 
n 
relation to distributional questions (e.g. the development of social 
accounting matrices, analysis of the so called informal sector, work on 
technical choice) which should provide the basis for practicle policy 
analysis. 
45. There is thus a need for renewed analysis of the possibilities of 
combining redistribution with the pursuit of other objectives - in this 
moment, macro-economic adjustment and renewed growth. 



